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ASSUMPTIONS

BEHIND SANCTITY OF DYING DECLARATIONS
Monoobhai

C. Amin*

All judicial systems, world-over, have barred the admission of hearsayevidence, because to act upon hearsay evidence is risky as it does not provide
any medium or instrument like cross-examination
to test the truthfulness,
falsity
or reliability of this type of evidence. Evidence in the nature of the statement of
the deceased i.e. dying declaration made about the circumstances
in which his
death resulted also falls in the category of hearsay evidence. Hence, any such
statement of the deceased as such remains irrelev.mt and inadmissible in evidence.
But out of necessity a compulsion arises to meet a peculiar situation which has
made this type of evidence, namely dying declaration, relevant and therefore
admissible by creating an exception to the general rule against admissibility of
hearsay evidence. This compulsion of necessity arises from the fact that in a
number of incidents of murder there is usually no eye-witness except the injured
victim. Hence, if his statement
about the circumstances
in which his death
occurred is not admitted in evidence during the criminal trial, then the only
evidence of crime would be lost and as a consequence of it the offender would
go scotfree and thus cause a miscarriage of justice. To balance this compulsion,
a dying declaration is made an admissible piece of evidence and the inherent
infirmity of the evidence in the nature of dying declaration, namely, that there is
no medium or instrument
like cross-examination
to test the truthfulness,
or
falsity of a dying declaration, support is derived from a belief or enunciation in
its favour on the basis that the dying man's deep faith in his religion would not
allow lies on his lips, while he is dying and when he knows that he is soon to
meet his Maker, i.e., God.

Historical Development of the Rule
The earliest judicial pronouncement

making dying declaration

admissible

in

evidence inspite of its being in the nature of hear-say evidence is found in the
case of King v William Woodcock, (J 789) 1 Leach, 500. Judge Eyre, Chief
Baron laid down as under:

"The general principles on which this species of evidence is admitted, is
that they are declarations made in extremity when the party is at the point of
death and when every hope in this world is gone. When every motive to
falsehood is silent and the mind is induced by the most powerful consideration
to speak the truth, a situation so solemn, and so awful is considered by the law
as creating obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath
administered in a Court of justice
But a difficulty also arises with respect
to such declarations i.e. whether the deceased herself apprehended that she

Advocate. Ahmedabad.
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was in such a state of morality as would inevitably oblige her soon to answer
before her Maker for the truth or falsehood of her assertions. "
Judge

Eyre at the same time cautioned

that

"Declarations

so made

are

certainly entitled to credit, they ought, therefore, to be received in evidence, but
the degree of credit to which they are entitled must always be a matter for the
sober consideration of the Jury under all the circumstances of the case."
Thus, even the earliest available judicial pronouncement
conscious about the weakness of dying declaration.

on the point was

It is significant to note the observations
made by Taylor that "though
declarations,
deliberately made under a solemn sense of impending death and
concerning circumstances wherein the deceased is not likely to be mistaken, are
entitled to great weight, it should always be recollected that the accused has no
power of cross examination, a power as effectual in eliciting the truth as is the
obligation
of an oath and that when a witness has not a deep sense of
accountability
to his Maker, feelings of anger or revenge or, in the case of
mutual conflict, the natural desire of screening his own misconduct may effect
the accuracy of his statement and give a false colouring to the whole transaction ",
It is observed

in Corpus Juris Secundum

Vol XL, Page] 283 that:

"In weighing the Dying Declarations, the Jury may consider the
circumstances under which they were made, as to whether they were due to
outside influence or were made in a spirit of revenge or when the declarant
was unable or unwilling to state the facts, the inconsistent or contradictory
character of the declarations, and the fact that deceased has not appeared and
the accused has been deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him, and
may give to them the credit and weight to which they believe, under all the
circumstances, they are fairly and reasonably entitled. "
In India in the relevant provision of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 the first exception to the rule against admissibility of hearsay evidence, is
as under:

"When statement is made by a person, as to the cause of his death
or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in
his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into
question". Such statement of the dead person, is made admissible. Such
statements are relevant whether the person who made them, was or was
not at the time when they were made, under expectation of death and
whatever may be the nature of the proceedings in which the cause of his
death comes into question.
While drafling and enacting Indian Evidence Act, ]872, the Select Committee
avoided to refer to the phrase hearsay evidence saying that the phrase 'hearsay
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evidence' which is used by the English writer in so vague and unsatisfactory
a
manner finds no place in our draft and we hope we have avoided the possibility
of any confusion in connection with it. This approach while drafting and enacting
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was totally arbitrary and was a clear disregard to
the universal concept of hearsay evidence and under all tests of theories and
systems of law of evidence. This comment is made only for the purpose of saying
that this approach of the select committee amounted to, knowingly, failing to
recognise a basic weakness to the evidence in the nature of Dying Declaration as
is made applicable in India. As a corollary to this approach para (2) in clause (1)
of Section 32 was further drafted and enacted which is a second weakness to the
evidence

in the nature of dying declaration.

Thus,

there

are three

salient

and basic differences,

between

the Indian

concept and English concept about Dying Declaration. Firstly, under English law
only when a charge is for the offence of homicide or manslaughter,
a Dying
Declaration
can be admissible as an evidence, whereas under Indian Law the
Dying Declaration is made admissible in all types of proceedings of both Civil
and Criminal nature, if in such proceedings the death of the person who made
such statement comes into question. Secondly, under the English law a dying
declaration is receivable in evidence of making it under the sense of impending
death, whereas para 2 of clause 1 of Section 32 of Indian Evidence Act, lays
down that irrespective of whether the person WI10. makes a Dying Declaration
was under the expectation of death or not at the time when the statement was
made, his Dying Declaration is admissible as evidence. Thirdly, under the English
law the judge has to approach the issue of the appreciation of Dying Declaration
with a judicial note i.e., consciousness
that such evidenc is hearsay in nature,
while under the Indian law, as said by the Select Committee the phrase 'hearsay
evidence' is purposefully
not imported in Indian law and is not given any
significance at all, though under the legal theory and truth it cannot be denied
that it is in totality hearsay evidence.
By para 2 of clause (1) of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the
very foundation from which the sanctity of a Dying Declaration is born is pulled
out from its ethical and religious base and it's consequent
evidenciary value.
Hence, the only justification in law, moral and social expediency for receiving
Dying Declaration in evidence as the situation found in majority of cases is that
no other witness or evidence to the crime is available.
In this article an attempt is made to show that, irrespective of the judicial
propositions made earlier and subsequent to the case of f(hushal Rao v State of
Bombay a need has arisen for the Su'preme Court to reverse its approach in the
last three decades to restate the law on judicial approach to Dying Declarations,
because the ground realities of the present times reduce the assumptions accepted
since centuries

for giving the very quality of sanctity to Dying Declaration

90

and

justifying its acceptability as a piece of evidence have not only become obsolete
but even should be considered as unrealistic, arbitrary and untrue as also
contrary to everyday experience of individual and social living today, particularly
so far as law and society in India are concerned.
For the first time in the above mentioned

case of Khushal Rao v State of

Bombay, a bench of three judges of the Supreme

Court differed from this long,
well-established
judicial approach of sound wisdom and prudence in case of
appreciating evidence in the nature of dying declaration by enunciating, a judicially
and factually erroneous pronouncement
to the effect that it cannot be laid down
as a general proposition that the dying declaration is a weaker kind of evidence
than other pieces of evidence. It stands on the same footing as any other piece of
evidence. In the view of the legislature, that test of veracity is supplied by the
solemn occassion when it was made, namely, at a time when the person making
the statement was in danger of losing his life. At such a serious and solemn
moment, that person is not expected to tell lies. The court continued "it cannot
be laid down as an absolute rule of law that a Dying Declaration cannot form the
sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated".
It should be said at this stage that the observation of the Supreme Court in
the case of Khushal Rao that "it cannot be laid down as a general proposition
that a Dying Declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of
evidence, is in total contrast to all the weak features surrounding
a Dying
Declaration,
which are described
above. The fact remains that the Dying
Declaration is a weaker kind of evidence than other pieces of evidence. Another
observation
of the Supreme Court in the above case of Khushal Rao that a
Dying Declaration stands on the same footing as another piece of evidence is
also equally fallacious both in practice and theory. The third observation of the
Supreme Court in the said case of Khushal Rao that a Dying Declaration, which

has been recorded by a competent Magistrate in the proper manner, stands on a
much higher footing then other types of Dying Declaration is equally illogical
and fallacious. Infirmities and weakness of a Dying Declaration whether made to
the relatives or to a competent

Magistrate

are the same and remain the same.

After the Kushal Rao's decision, for more than three decades, the Supreme
Court's position has remain unchanged. The too general a statement made by
the Supreme Court in the case of State of u.P. v Ramasagar Yadav that it is
well settled that as a matter of law, a dying declaration can be acted upon
without corroboration
and that there is not even a rule of prudence which has
hardened
into a rule of lavy that a dying declaration cannot be acted upon,
unless it is corroborated
is extremely wide and inconsistent
with the actual
judicial approach in practice. Usually the courts look for independent corroboration
in support of a dying declaration before basing a conviction
Declaration and this is nothing else but a rule of prudence.
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solely on a Dying

The enunciation
settled to be doubted

made in the case of Kori v State, that
"it is too well
that it is unsafe to found a conviction solely upon a Dying

Declaration. Unlike the evidence of an accomplice, a Dying Declaration is not
trainted. Neverthless, it is a rule of prudence that to found a conviction upon it,
a Dying Declaration should be corroborated
in material particulars. This rule of
prudence, however, does not affect the law on the point, namely, that a Dying
Declaration may well be the sole basis of conviction. A Dying Declaration can be
as good or as bad, as any other piece of evidence and the value to be attached to
it must necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstance of each case. Naturally
the Court cannot ignore that a Dying Declaration is not upon oath, is not made
in the presence of the person affected, and is not tested by cross-examination.
The~e and other considerations
must be present in the mind of the court in
assessing the value of any Dying Oeclaration. If the Court, after taking everything
into consideration,
is convinced, that the declaration is true, it is its duty to
convict notwithstanding
that there is no corroboration".
This approach of the
Calcutta Iligh Court is probably a better exposition and judicial approach towards
the appreciation of evidence of a Dying Declaration in a criminal trial than the
one, expressed buy the Supreme Court in the case of Khushal Rao v State of
Maharashtra and a series of other cases reported thereafter.
This approach in practice would amount to taking a decision of guilt after
judicially ascertaining
all the weakness and infirmities of a Dying Declaration
described and narrated above. Thus, it is a rule of prudence that under the
Indian law a decision of guilt should not be arrived at on the sole basis of a
Dying Declaration and that there should be some independent corroboration
to
the evidence in the nature of a Dying Declaration. This rule of prudence cannot
be overlooked by saying that it is not an absolute principle that a Dying Declaration
cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated.
In the author's view, though not so satisfying, the better enunciationed
approach to evidence of Dying Declaration is found in case of Tarachand v State
of Maharashtra, which states that "Anyway, a Dying Declaration is not to be
believed

because

no possible

reasons

can be given for accusing

falsely. It can only be believed if there are no grounds

for doubting

the

accused

it at al!."

Probably except in the decisions of Kori v State and of Ranmath v State of
Madya Pradesh there is no pronouncement
that it is a rule of prudence to seek
corroboration
before a court bases conviction solely on a Dying Declaration.
Nor, is there any pronouncement
to the effect that a court cannot convict solely
on the basis of an uncorroborated
Dying Declaration. Neverthless, it requires to
be judicially accepted, that Dying Declaration is by its nature a weak and infirm
piece of evidence and Courts should approach it, being conscious of its weaknesses.
At this stage it would be interesting
Supreme

Court

of Papua

to consider

and New Guinea
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the decision

given by the

in the case of Queen v Madobi

reported in 6th Federal Law Reports (1963) F.I. in which the statement by a
native of Papua and New Guinea was held as inadmissible in evidence though it
was a Dying Declaration stating that "a statement by a native of Papua and New
Guinea whose belief in life after death was that it would be spent on a
neighbouring
uninhabitated
island and upon whom there was, therefore,
solemn sanction to speak truth, is not admissible as a Dying Dcclaration."
Jon R. Walts, American Jurist, in his hook 'Criminal

evidence'

no

(1975) on p.

75 observes that "It has been thought, rightly or wrongly, that Dying Declaration
have intrinsic
assurances
of trustworthiness,
making cross examination
unnecessary.
The notion is that a person who is in the process of dying and
knows it, will be truthful immediately before departing to mcet his Maker. Of
course the validity of this hearsay exceptions is open to some debate. What
about the person who is not religious? What of the person who, as his last act,
seeks revenge by falsely naming a life-long cncmy as his killer? How reliable is
the perception and memory of a person who is dying?"
However the present state of religious belief, naturally, affords ample grounds
of differences, as to the under-pinnings
of the rule. However, the courts in
general have declined to allow exploration of the declarant's religious views.
The Privy Council in Nemhhard v Queen (1982) 1 AII.E.R. 182 on Section
32 (1) of the Indian evidence Act, 1872 opined that the evidence of Dying
Declaration under the Indian law lacks the special quality as in Common Law
and hence the weight to be attached to a Dying Declaration admitted under
section 32 of the Indian EviJence Act would nccessarily be less than that
attached to a Dying Declaration admitted under the common law rules.
The below cited observations
importance:-

from the decision of Nembhard are of significant

"A final observation should be made concerning the cases already
mentioned that have been decided in the Court of Appeal for Eastern
Africa. It appears that a rule of practice has been developed that when a
Dying Declaration has been the only evidence implicating an accused
person a conviction usually cannot be allowed to stand where there had
been a failure to give a warning on the necessity for corroboration: see
for example Pius Jasunga s/'o A/wnw v R (1.954) 2 EACA 331 and Terikabi
v Uganda (1.975) EA 60. But it is important to notice that in the countries
concerned the admissibility of Dying Declaration does not depend on the
common law test, that is on the deceased having at the time a settled
hopeless expectation of impending death. Instead there is the very different
statutory provision contained in 32(1) of/he Indian Evidence Act 1872.
In Akumu it was pointed that the weigl1t to be attached to a Dying
Declaration admitted by reference to Section 32 of the Indian Evidence
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Act would necessarily be less than that attached to a Dying Declaration
admitted under the common law rules. The first kind of statement would
lack that special quality that is thought to surround a declaration made
by dying man who was conscious of his condition and who had given up
all hope of survival. Accordingly it may not seem sup rising that the courts
dealing with such statements have felt the need to exercise even more
caution in the use to be made of them than is the case where the common
law test is applied."
It is humbly submitted that a need has arisen for the Supreme Court to
restate the law on the judicial approach to the evidence of a Dying Declaration
after taking stock of the present-day realistic situation, historically judical and
morally obsolete background
surrounding
the law on the evidence of a Dying
Declaration.
In conclusion,

it is difficult to deny that:

a.

A Dying Declaration is in fact a weak and inferior type of evidence because
(1) its truthfulness
cannot be tested by cross-examination
by the accused
who is sought to be damned for life on it's assumed truthfulness.
(2) It is
not made under an obligation of oath (3) Unlike the British Law it is not
necessary in India to prove that it was made under a hopeless expectation
of immediate death, a situation imposing moral weight and burden on the
person making the statement that if he would die with lies on his lips he
would suffer the consequences of his such sin and (4) it is made in a kind
of secrecy; in contrast to the trial of accused held openly in public.

b.

A Dying Declaration does not stand on the same footing as other piece of
evidence;
like evidence
of an eye-witness
or approver,
confession,
incriminating

c.

discovery etc.

All assumptions
of the truthfulness
of a Dying Declaration are rendered
obsolete and unrealistic by the tremedous epoch-making changes tragically
lowering the levels of all moral and religious beliefs which have substantially
shaken and eroded the very foundation of such assumptions.

Though in law an accused can be convicted on the sole evidence of a Dying
Declaration without any corroboration (because of a helpless compulsion arising
out of necessity) a Court should so convict an accused only if from the evidence
of a Dying Declaration it comes to an unhestitating conclusion that it is absolutely
reliable and that it is an unalloyed truth. Otherwise the Court must seek for
some corroboration before basing a conviction on the basis of a Dying Declaration.
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